Modern cockpits can navigate through cloud, warn of terrain and even land the aircraft unaided. Yet from monsoon thunderstorms to thin mountain air, and to a cockpit emergency over the Middle East last month, aviation’s hardest moments still turn on human judgement, and on the pilot in the second seat.
It is a reminder from the flight deck: On 30 September 2026, flydubai flight FZ1073, bound for Tel Aviv from Dubai with 174 passengers and eight crew, made an emergency landing at Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. UAE authorities have since said that the co-pilot allegedly attacked the captain and tried to take control of the aircraft; the investigation is continuing. The captain, Indian pilot Smit Machchhar, was seriously injured but managed to open the cockpit door, allowing crew and passengers to restrain the attacker; flydubai says company crew travelling on board as passengers then secured the aircraft and diverted it to Tabuk.
Such events are extremely rare. But FZ1073 offers a vivid reminder of something aviation safety specialists stress constantly: every layer of protection in a cockpit, technological or procedural, ultimately depends on people. That is true whether the challenge is a malfunctioning system, a wall of monsoon cloud or a colleague who cannot, or will not, fly safely.
Cockpits that can fly themselves
Over two decades, glass cockpits, with integrated digital displays in place of analogue gauges, have spread from airliners to training and business aircraft. Synthetic vision now draws a three-dimensional image of terrain, obstacles and runways from onboard databases, helping pilots avoid controlled flight into terrain in cloud or darkness. Envelope-protection systems resist dangerous manoeuvres, and runway-overrun alerting warns crews when a landing is likely to run long.
The most striking advance is emergency autoland. On 20 December 2025, a Beechcraft King Air 200 suffered a rapid loss of cabin pressure after departing Aspen, Colorado. Its Garmin Autoland system engaged, selected an airport, communicated with air traffic control and landed safely at Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport, the first use of the system in a real emergency.
Autoland is designed for one scenario: a pilot who is unable to fly. It cannot reliably protect against a pilot who chooses to do harm, because crews must always be able to override automation when it fails. Any protection a pilot can switch on, a pilot can usually switch off.
The automation paradox
Automation brings its own hazard. As computers handle more of the flying, pilots get fewer opportunities to practise manual skills and may struggle when systems fail or behave unexpectedly. Accident investigations worldwide have cited confusion over automation modes and weakened hand-flying skills. The remedy is not less technology but better training, with regular manual practice and simulator scenarios in which automation fails.
The pull of the destination
Weather tests judgement in a different way. Specialists describe plan continuation bias, sometimes called “get-there-itis”: once committed to a plan, people tend to continue even as evidence mounts that it is no longer safe. Each small deterioration seems acceptable; together they can trap a competent crew.
The countermeasure is aeronautical decision-making (ADM): identifying hazards early, setting limits in advance and treating a diversion or go-around as a normal professional decision, not a failure.
Monsoon storms and thin air
India’s monsoon produces towering cumulonimbus clouds with severe turbulence, hail, lightning and microbursts, powerful downdraughts that can suddenly strip an aircraft of airspeed close to the ground. Storms can develop faster than forecasts predict, and heavy rain lengthens stopping distances on wet runways.
Heat and altitude create a quieter danger. Density altitude rises with temperature, elevation and humidity, thinning the air so that engines produce less power and wings less lift. Aircraft need longer runways and climb more slowly. Leh airport, at about 3,256 metres, is among the world’s most demanding, and pre-monsoon heat raises density altitude even on the plains. Operators fly in the cool early morning and limit payloads.
When the second voice was not enough
India’s own case study is the crash of Air India Express flight IX-1344 at Kozhikode on 7 August 2020, in which 21 people died. Landing on a tabletop runway in rain and thunderstorm, the Boeing 737 touched down about 4,438 feet along the 8,858-foot runway and overran its end. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau found that the pilot flying continued an unstabilised approach despite a “go around” call from the pilot monitoring, who did not take over the controls. It also cited time pressure and possible overconfidence.
Why two pilots still matter
Kozhikode and FZ1073 are very different events, but both show the importance of the second pilot. In one, the second voice was not acted upon; in the other, the second pilot’s actions helped save the aircraft. That matters because aircraft makers and some regulators have studied reduced-crew operations, in which a single pilot would manage the cruise phase of long flights. Pilot associations have opposed the idea, arguing that two qualified pilots provide an essential layer of safety that automation cannot yet replace.
Crew resource management (CRM) training is designed to make the second pilot effective: empowered to challenge, to call a go-around and, if necessary, to take control. Reinforced cockpit doors, mandatory since 2001, add security but can also lock help out, as the 2015 Germanwings disaster showed, which is why procedures on cockpit access continue to evolve.
Lessons for India’s pilot boom
India is training pilots on an unprecedented scale. A parliamentary reply listed 35 DGCA-approved flying training organisations operating from 53 bases, and most new trainers have glass cockpits. In 2023, the DGCA also proposed measures to support the mental well-being of flight crew.
The priorities are clear: strong manual flying skills, CRM that gives junior pilots real authority, a culture in which no one is penalised for a safe diversion, and robust screening of everyone admitted to the flight deck. Technology will keep making aircraft safer. The decisive safeguard, as every one of these stories shows, remains a well-trained, trustworthy crew.
– Dr. Ramu Suravajjula
